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Credit supply constraints and financial policies of listed companies during the 2007-
2009 financial crisis 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study examines the effects of lending constraints on the financial policies of UK 
publicly listed companies during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  Using a sample of 2039 
publicly listed firms, the results of our analysis indicate that financial policies of firms are 
sensitive to variations in the supply of external finance and credit, suggesting that liquidity-
constraint firms with low cash reserves suffered more at the time of the credit crunch. While 
managing through the potential negative effects of the financial crisis, majority of the sample 
companies increased the use of internal finance and deferred the payments of dividends 
which helped them apply effective financial policies during the crisis period. The findings of 
this study also document that during the crisis period, financial policies of firms were 
exposed to variations in the supply of finance and credit, which, by implication, posed a 
threat to their operations, sustainability and growth. Our findings produce awareness about 
the negative effects of the non-availability of external finance and credit supply to listed 
companies, and signify the role of different financing channels and credit system in the 
operations and growth of listed companies. These findings have implications for financial 
regulation and policy making in the UK. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis is widely recognized as the most severe global economic 
downturn since the Great Depression (see for example, Mian and Sufi, 2009; Melvin and 
Taylor, 2009; Frederic, 2011; Obstfeld, 2012). The crisis originated from the US in 2007 and 
has affected markets and institutions at the core of the financial system around the world (see 
for example, Majid and Kassim, 2009; Brzoza-Brzezina and Mikulski, 2011; Mala and 
Chand, 2012; Jones et al., 2012; Flannery et al., 2013).  In the United Kingdom, the effect of 
the financial crisis became evident in the aftermath of an increased number of defaults in the 
financial sector, such as, Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley, Alliance and Leicester, 
HBOS and a number of other building societies (Hall, 2008; Hall, 2009).   
The increased number of defaults has raised awareness concerning risk management on 
the part of financial institutions. As a result, financial institutions have become more cautious 
and are taking various measures for reducing risk in their lending activities.  Predominantly 
banks have tightened lending through imposing more complex terms and conditions.  This 
raises the concern that disruptions in lending may have caused significant shocks to the 
supply of credit, which militate against the corporate investment and operational undertakings 
(Nanda and Nicholas, 2013). Thus the depth and scale of the potential impacts of the 
financial crisis on the corporate sector have helped engender a growing body of research with 
a particular reference to the effects of the financial crisis (see for example, Saleem, 2009; 
Leary, 2009; Lemmon and Roberts 2010; Lin and Paravisini, 2013; Mac an Bhaird, 2013; 
Yarovaya and  Lau, 2016; Cevik, Dibooglu and  Kenc, 2016; Jiang, 2017) .   
In this regard, Lemmon and Roberts (2010) investigate the shocks to the junk bond 
market caused by regulation changes and the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990s, 
and the subsequent effects on the leverage and investment decisions of firms which borrowed 
from that market. Their results indicate that aggregate external financing activities were 
squeezed, and the financing and investment decisions of below investment grade firms were 
affected as a result of financial crisis of that time.  Similarly, Voutsinas and Werner (2011), 
Carey et al. 2012, Forsberg 2012, show that the capital structure of firms is sensitive to 
variations in the supply of credit.  However, Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey 
(2012) indicate that the average size of available credit lines did not change during the crisis 
period in Europe.   All these findings thus present mixed and inconclusive evidence on this 
issue. 
While recognizing existing literature’s substantial contribution, we submit that material 
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shortcomings remain.  Firstly, these relate most notably to unduly limited examination of 
capital structure in response to credit shocks. The existing literature has not adequately 
explored the role of individual components of capital structure and as a result the findings are 
not able to fully identify which component of capital structure is more sensitive to credit 
supply contractions as compared to another. Secondly, existing studies on financial crisis are 
predominantly based on the US market. However, it has been recognized by the existing 
literature that there are institutional differences in terms of culture, insolvency code, tax 
system, accounting regulation and ownership structure between the US and other economies 
of the world (see for example, Franks and Torous, 1996; Dahya and Travlos, 2000; Beattie, 
Goodacre and Thomson, 2006; Akbar, Shah and Stark, 2011) . Investigating the financial 
policies of publicly listed firms during the 2007-2009 financial crisis with data from the UK 
economic system is therefore expected to provide new insights. 
It is therefore evident from the above discussions that due to institutional and cultural 
differences between the US and other countries, the applicability of research findings from 
US data is limited to other economies.  It is thus argued that the impact of variations in the 
supply of credit on the financial policies of firms outside the US needs examination.  
Accordingly, we carry out this investigation for the generation of new evidence on this issue 
by employing a sample of UK publicly listed companies. We consider the UK for this 
investigation because UK has one of the largest stock markets outside of the US, which 
provides a different institutional setting and regulations. In addition, despite the severe 
implications of the current financial crisis on the UK economy there is still little evidence 
available on these issues in the UK. We therefore address the following research questions in 
this paper.   
1. Is there any effect of credit supply contractions on the financial policies of public 
firms in the United Kingdom?  
2. How does shock to the supply of credit affect the leverage ratios of publicly listed 
firms in the United Kingdom?  
3. Which component of capital structure is affected the most by the credit supply 
contractions? 
4. Does publicly listed firms in the United Kingdom switched to alternative sources of 
finance during the period of credit supply contractions? 
Keeping the above questions in mind and in order to investigate the contemporary effect of 
the financial crisis on the financial policies of UK public firms this study uses a sample of 
2039 publicly listed firms over the period between 2004 and 2009. We take a closer look at 
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the impact of the financial crisis on the capital structure by making a detailed analyses of the 
debt components and other sources of finance with a view to identify the channels through 
which the supply shock travels. Our empirical strategy enables us to identify how publicly 
listed firms minimized the effect of credit contractions by resorting to alternative sources of 
finance such as internal funds, net debt issue, trade credit and net equity issue. In particular, it 
helped us gain enhanced understanding of the extent of substitution across credit sources.  
This would also help clarify how public firms manage their finances during the crisis period.     
However, investigating the effect of credit supply shocks on firms’ financing behaviour 
poses identification problems because we need to separate the supply effect from the 
endogenous demand effect. We have tried to cover this problem from three different 
perspectives. First, we cover the identification of exogenous variations in the supply of credit 
from the pre-crisis to the crisis periods. Second, we adopt firm fixed effects models to control 
interdependence among variables.  As our study is using panel data set, there is a potential 
concern of unobserved heterogeneity, however, fixed effect regression models account for 
this problem, because such models have the advantage that it accounts for both observable 
and unobservable firm characteristics and heterogeneity (Bougheas, Mizen and Yalcin 2006; 
Mateut, Bougheas and Mizen, 2006; Gan, 2007; Xiaolou, 2011). Third, to account for 
demand side factors, this study includes firm level variables, which are used as proxy for firm 
demand. 
The results show that financial crisis has negatively affected the total debt ratio of 
publicly listed firms.  The results further highlight that financial crisis has heterogeneously 
influenced the components of firms’ financial structure, whose effects are transmitted through 
the trade credit channel rather than the short term and long-term financing channels. We 
conclude that financial policies of publicly listed firms are sensitive to variations in the 
supply of credit during the course of the financial crisis. The practical potential of this study 
in terms of policy making is thus to inform the decision makers of the monetary authorities 
about their attitude in corporate lending.  This is more important at a time like the present 
when continuity and sustainability is uncertain and is subject to the effect of global 
instability.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of previous 
literature which contains discussions on both current and classical studies.  Section 3 
discusses methodology and data.  This section provides details of the empirical strategy by 
highlighting theoretical background of the models, and description of the data collection 
process, measurement of variables, and model specification and econometric issues. Section 4 
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highlights results from the estimation of all models where detailed commentary is provided 
and the outcome is matched with the existing literature.  Finally, section 5 concludes the 
paper by presenting a short summary of the study and by citing some limitations and avenues 
for future research.  
 
2.    Review of Literature 
 
2.1 Theoretical Developments 
 
Theoretical developments covering the capital structure of firms originates from Modigiliani 
and Miller (1958), who argue that in a perfect capital market, in the absence of transaction 
costs and taxes, the market value of a firms is depending upon its earning power and risk of 
underlying assets, and is independent from capital structure.  However, Modigiliani and 
Miller (1963) incorporate tax advantage as a potential determinant of capital structure and 
argue that firms can maximize their value by employing more debt in their capital structure 
because of the tax shield advantage associated with the use of debt and that firms can 
maximise their value by employing more debt in their capital structure.  In another seminal 
paper, Miller (1977) argues that in a world where interest payments are tax deductible the 
value of the firm still remain independent from its capital structure.  
Over the years several theoretical papers have covered the notion of optimal capital 
structure, such as agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), signalling theory (Ross 1977), 
the bankruptcy cost theory (Titman 1984), and the pecking order theory (Myers 1984; Myers 
and Majluf 1984).  Most of these and other relevant theories have relaxed the assumptions of 
perfect capital market and provided evidence that, in an imperfect capital market, firms’ 
financing does affect their value, suggesting that firms’ financing decisions matter in an 
imperfect capital market. Jensen (1986) argues that debt financing reduces the conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders.  Those theories which are based on information 
asymmetry suggest that information imbalance plays a significant important role in 
determining firms’ optimal capital structure (Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu 2009).  In this 
regard, Gatchev, Spindt and Tarhan (2009) highlight that information asymmetry and agency 
cost play a significant role in the firms’ financing decisions.   
Ardalan (2008) however, regards the mainstream published academic literature in finance 
as mainly focusing upon the functionalist paradigm which according to the arguments raised 
in this study, the classical finance theories do not consider.  He argues that the application of 
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other theoretical approaches in finance is beneficial for enhancing our understanding about 
the nature of issues covered in finance research. Similarly, Ardalan (2017) regards the 
assumption about the capital structure irrelevance of firms as unrealistic and argue that as the 
result of financial models in the mainstream finance literature are based on certain 
assumptions, a change in those assumptions will make the findings questionable. He argues 
that the objective of a firm is share price maximisations, and as debt as a source of finance 
contain risk, the capital structure cannot be irrelevant and that there is an optimal capital 
structure for firms. 
In relation to understanding the causes of the recent financial crisis, Lawson (2009) regard 
existing theoretical frameworks used by current research papers as an insufficient and asks 
for the establishment of a more grounded theoretical framework for the understanding the 
crisis. Considering the limitation of existing theoretical literature (see for example, 
Modigiliani and Miller 1958, 1963, amongst others), and the arguments raised about the 
methodological limitations of the mainstream finance research (see for example, Ardalan 
2008; Lagoarde-Segot 2016; Ardalan 2017, amongst others), use of a more refined 
framework will be beneficial for understanding the causes and implications of the crisis.  In 
line with these arguments this study constructs a model where a firm’s capital structure is a 
function of both demand and supply side factors.   It is therefore expected that the outcome of 
our results will provide new insights in this area of research which will help us better 
understand the causes and implications of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. An overview of 
existing literature in this area is presented in sub-section 2.2 and 2.3 below.  
 
2.2 Credit Supply Contractions and Firms’ Financing Mix 
 
There is abundance of theoretical and empirical literature which suggests that the financing 
mix of large publicly listed firms is not sensitive to variations in the supply of bank credit.  In 
addition, due to the prevailing financial reporting regulations, information in the financial 
statements of publicly traded firms is generally regarded as reliable and true.  As a result 
listed firms have easier access to wider channels for raising funds, such as, public market,  
commercial paper market, etc. (see for example, Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983; Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1993; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011).  Even in a tightening monetary situation, the 
flow of bank credit and non-bank debt to larger firms increases (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; 
Frank and Goyal, 2009; Acharya and Rangarajan, 2011 ).  Similar findings are also reported 
by, Oliner and Rudebusch (1995), Kashyap and Stein (2000), and Berger, Miller, Petersen, 
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Rajan and Jeremy (2005) who argue that the proportion of debt including bank and non-bank 
debt as well as trade debt in the capital structure of larger public firms expanded during the 
monetary contraction period.  
Several studies have examined banks’ lending behaviour in the tight monetary period and 
confirmed that bank loans were decreased to financially-constrained firms whereas to the 
non-financially-constrained firms the amount of loans increased (Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1994;Oliner and Rudebusch, 1995; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996; Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1996). Similarly, findings of Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) suggest that bank 
lending to larger public firms are not much affected following stringent monetary policy.  
While investigating the impact of  the current financial crisis on large public firms, Iyer et al. 
(2010) argue that the 2007-2009 financial crisis did not significantly disturb the credit flow to 
large firms.  
The overall findings of the above-mentioned papers thus suggest that credit contractions 
have not significantly affected the financing mix of large listed firms. These findings are also 
in line with the argument that listed firms maintain long track records, better diversification, 
economies of scale in generating and reporting information and low agency cost of external 
finance (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996; Clarke et al. 2012; Cull and Martinez Paeris, 
2013). In addition, information asymmetry and idiosyncratic risk are likely to be low in these 
firms and as a result, these firms raise funds from a number of external sources of finance 
such as; issuing debt, equity and commercial papers in the open market (Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1993; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Stein, 2003).  Even they 
could also avail the opportunity of reallocating their loans demand within the banking system 
(Bruno, 2009).  It has also been reported in the literature that banks only consider safer loan 
options during tight credit conditions (see for example, Lang and Nakamura, 1995). 
In contrast to the foregoing, Lemmon and Roberts (2010) demonstrate that large public 
firms are vulnerable to the credit supply shocks. They find a significant impact of the 
exogenous shocks to credit supply on the financing decisions of below investment-grade 
firms and observe more reduction of external finance for such firms following shocks to the 
supply of credit. They also report that a reduction in the supply of credit is mostly 
concentrated in the net long term debt issuance category.  They argue that although the 
supply of credit contractions affects the financing activities of below investment-grade firms, 
their effect on the leverage ratio is negligible. Similarly, Gambacota, and Marques-Ibanez 
(2011) highlight that banks with weaker capital positions restricted the provision of loans 
during the crisis period. 
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In a related context, Lin and Paravisini (2013) examine how credit shocks affect firm 
financial and investment policies. They take the bankruptcy of the WorldCom in 2002 as a 
natural experiment to investigate whether the WorldCom events exert the heterogeneous 
effect on the US banks supply of credit, which, in turn, influence firms’ external cost of debt 
financing. They find that banks which participated in syndicate loans to the WorldCom firms 
reduced the supply of credit to those firms more than the non-participating banks during the 
post crisis period. The reduction was found stronger on bank-dependent firms as compared to 
other firms. Among the bank-dependent firms, those firms whose main lenders were exposed 
to the WorldCom events face increased costs of raising further bank finance due to the 
adverse selection problem. Similarly, Voutsinas and Werner (2011) and Saretto and Tookes 
(2013), show that the capital structure of firms is sensitive to variations in the supply of 
credit. 
After summarising findings of the above mentioned studies we argue that the overall 
evidence is mixed and inconclusive. It is not clear from findings of the existing studies as to 
which components of financing mix are more sensitive to variations in the supply of credit as 
compared to others. This specifies gaps in the existing literature which need further 
investigations.  We now discuss the behaviour of firms with respect to alternative sources of 
finance in the next section. 
 
2.3   Credit Supply Contractions and Alternative Sources of Finance  
 
Some of the latest research findings document that when the supply of external credit 
squeezes, firms’ substitute to alternative sources of finance in the form of internal finance, 
debt (bond debt), trade credit and equity finance (Leary, 2009; Campello et al. 2011; Lin and 
Paravisini, 2012).  These alternative sources of finance serve as a buffer to alleviate credit 
constraints due to the credit supply shocks (Kashyap, Lamont and Stein, 1994; Bae, Kang and 
Lim, 2002; Leary, 2009) .  In addition, findings of a survey conducted by Graham and 
Harvey (2001) suggest that practitioners view ‘Financial Flexibility’ as an important factor in 
deciding about the sources of finance to use.  
One of the techniques of maintaining financial flexibility is the use of internal finance. In 
this regard, the importance of internal finance is evidenced in the Myers (2001) seminal 
report which highlights that, ‘Most of the aggregate gross investment by US nonfinancial 
corporations has been financed from internal cash flow (depreciation and retained 
earnings)’. Similarly, Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2013) document that at times of 
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higher risk, gaining credit is costly for firms and as result they opt to use internally generated 
cash for their finances.  Likewise, most of the previous studies on capital structure show that 
internal finance is an important determinant of firms’ financing decision (see for example, 
Jordan, Lowe and Taylor, 1998; Ozkan, 2001; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Panno, 2003). These 
studies suggest that firms tend to rely more on internal finance, should they face restricted 
access to external finance. 
With respect to bond finance, it is also documented in some recent research findings that 
large public firms substitute to bond finance when bank finance is squeezed.  In this regard, 
the findings of Judge and Korzhenitskaya (2012) suggest that large firms are more likely to 
immune themselves by resorting to bond finance when they face restricted access to bank 
finance. Their other analyses are based on the sub-sample of leverage and credit rating, which 
reveals that the effect of bank loan supply is pronounced on high leveraged and speculative 
grade firms. 
On the issue of equity as an alternative source of finance, Kahle and Stulz (2013) and Lin 
and Paravisini (2012 ) note that firms are more likely to substitute to equity finance and hold 
more cash following negative shocks to bank credit. They regard an increase in a firm’s 
equity issue as an indication towards a decline in the firm’s leverage and argue that that cash 
holding of firms’ increase immediately after the credit supply shocks which they maintain for 
two years after the shock.  This finding is consistent with the precautionary saving motive 
which would help firms during and after the period of credit contractions.  
Some empirical studies, however, do not support the notion that firms would resort to 
alternative sources of finance when the supply of credit squeezes.  In this regard, Campello et 
al. (2011) and Lemmon and Roberts (2010) find limited evidence regarding firms’ 
substitution towards alternative sources of finance such as internal finance, short term debt, 
trade credit, equity, and change in dividends pay-out following shocks to the supply of credit. 
Similarly, Judge and Korzhenitskaya (2012) and  Leary (2009) find that firms, which have 
access to public debt market, are less likely to use alternative sources of finance following the 
credit crunch and argues that large firms substitute from private to public debt during tight 
monetary conditions. 
On the basis of the above discussions we argue that the role of alternative sources of 
finance during the period of shocks to the supply of credit is not clear from the existing 
findings. Moreover, findings of the existing studies do not fully distinguish the sources of 
finance which are sensitive to the credit supply shocks from those which are not. In light of 
this argument and by considering the lack of consensus among the findings of the published 
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literature in this area a re-examination of this issue is worth doing. In order to meet our 
research objectives and to conduct a detailed investigation of all related issues we discuss our 
research methodology and data in the section 3 below. 
 
3.    Methodology and Data 
 
3.1   Methodology 
 
In order to investigate the effect of credit supply shocks on the financial policies of UK 
public firms we first consider the Modigliani and Miller (1958) hypothesis of a firm’s capital 
structure as a function of various demand side factors as the first step in our methodology.  In 
line with this hypothesis, many existing studies have modelled a firm’s financing mix as a 
function of firm characteristics with respect to size, age and growth as well as its financial 
status with respect to profitability, risk, asset tangibility and liquidity (see for example, 
Ozkan, 2001; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Akbar, Rehman and 
Ormrod, 2013).  In a functional form this can be expressed as follows. 
CS = f (size, age, growth, profitability, risk, asset tangibility, liquidity)   (a) 
A firm’s capital structure function is constructed on the basis of an implicit assumption 
that the supply of capital is frictionless, and accordingly any firm can finance all value-
enhancing projects.  However, new findings about capital market imperfections in recent 
years have challenged the Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) perfect capital market hypotheses 
and document that the financing of firms depend on both demand and supply factors (see for 
example, Sufi 2009; Choi, Getmansky, Henderson and Tookes 2010; Lemmon and Roberts 
2010). Similarly, Ardalan (2008, 2017), and Lagoarde-Segot (2016) regard the theoretical 
assumptions about the capital structure irrelevance of firms as unrealistic because a change in 
those assumptions is making the research findings questionable, and asks for the application 
of other theoretical approaches.  Lawson (2009) suggests that existing theoretical frameworks 
used by current research papers for understanding the causes of financial crisis are 
insufficient and asks for the establishment of a more grounded framework for the 
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understanding the crisis. We therefore construct a model where a firm’s capital structure is a 
function of both demand and supply side factors as follows.                 
CS = γ0 + γ1D + γ2S+ εit                                                                                       (b) 
Where, D stands for demand shocks and S stands for supply shocks.                                                                       
On estimating the effect of credit supply shocks on firms’ financing, changes in capital 
structure due the financial crisis may simply reflect the unobserved shift in firms’ demand for 
capital (Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010; Puri, Rocholl and Steffen, 2011).  We therefore 
separate the effect of supply shocks from the demand effect by a three-step identification 
strategy. First, as the crisis has negatively affected both the supply and demand of credit we 
identify external variations in the supply of credit and recognise the effect of credit supply 
shocks on the capital structure of firms during the recent fincial crisis. Second, in order to 
overcome the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in panel data, we have adopted firm fixed 
effects models, because it produces unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates (Jeon and 
Miller, 2004). Third, a set of control variables have been used for isolating the effect of 
demand factors, which include, return on assets and growth and their interaction with the 
crisis dummy as a proxy for firms’ demand1.  These steps not only permit us to identify the 
supply effects but also help us in separating the pre-crisis effects from the crisis effects (see 
for example, Gan, 2007; Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende, 2007; Sufi, 2009; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2011; Akbar, Rehman and Ormrod, 2013, amongst others).  
To capture the change from pre-crisis to the crisis period, we extend model (b) by 
incorporating interactive terms between the dummy variable representing the financial crisis 
and demand and supply variables. The matrix representation of simultaneous equation models 
is expressed below. 
CSit = γ0 + γ1*Dit + γ2*Crisis+ γ3*Dit*Crisis + εit                                                              (c) 
Where, CSit is a vector representing firms’ leverage ratios; Dit is a matrix of firm-level 
control variables representing the demand side factors; Crisis is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 for the period 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise for the period 2004-2006; γ1 is the 
coefficient matrix capturing the effect of demand side factors; γ2 is the coefficient matrix 
                                                 
1 In the trade credit model we use cash flows and growth and their interaction with the crisis dummy as the 
control variables. 
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capturing the credit supply shock effect by identifying the extent to which firms’ financial 
structure is affected by the financial crisis, γ3 is the coefficient matrix of the interactive terms 
measuring the change in demand factors during the crisis period relative to the pre-crisis 
period.   
 Model (c) is the benchmark model for the total debt ratio which is regressed on both the 
demand and supply side factors.  We further decompose total debt into long term debt, short 
term debt and trade credit.  The three components of the debt structure are then entered into 
the equations as the dependent variables and as a result the following equations are formed.  
Long term debt = γ0+ γ11*ROA + γ12* GT+ γ2*CR + γ31* GT *CR + γ32* ROA *CR+ εit    (d) 
Short term debt = γ0+ γ11 *ROA + γ12* GT+ γ2*CR + γ31* GT *CR + γ32* ROA *CR+ εit  (e)      
Trade Credit = γ0+ γ11 *CF + γ12* GT+ γ2*CR + γ31* GT *CR + γ32* CF *CR+ εit   (f) 
Next, we extend model (c) by taking account of net debt issue, net equity issue, cash 
reserves and dividends which are regressed on the control variables and the supply side 
dummy. The resulting equations are reported as follows. 
 
Net Debt Issue = γ0+ γ11*ROA + γ12*GT+ γ2*CR + γ31*GT*CR + γ32*ROA*CR+ εit    (g) 
Net Equity Issue = γ0+ γ11*ROA + γ12* GT+ γ2*CR + γ31*GT *CR + γ32*ROA*CR+ εit     (h) 
Cash Reserves = γ0+ γ11*CF + γ12* GT+ γ2*CR + γ31*GT *CR + γ32*CF*CR+ εit   (i)  
Dividends = γ0+ γ11*ROA + γ12* GT+ γ2*CR + γ31* GT *CR + γ32*ROA*CR+ εit   (j)                                                                                                                           
3.2 Variables 
 
Total debt (CS) includes all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations and is measured 
as the sum of short term debt, long term debt and trade credit, divided by total assets.  Long 
term debt is measured as all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding those amounts 
which are due for payment within one year, divided by total assets. Short-term debt includes 
bank overdraft, notes payable and the current portion of long term debt due for payment 
within one year, divided by total assets. Trade credit is taken as the measure of trade credit 
during the year, divided by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is measured as earnings 
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before interest and tax, divided by total assets. Growth (GT) is measured as sales in year t 
divided by sales in year t-1.  Net equity issue is measured as the change in issued capital 
divided by start of the period issued capital. Net debt issue is measured as the change in the 
sum of short term debt and long term debt divided by the sum of the start of period short term 
debt plus long term debt. Cash flow (CF) is measured as cash flows from operating activities, 
divided by total assets. Cash reserves are measured as change in cash and cash equivalent 
divided by the start of the period cash and cash equivalent. Dividends is measured as change 
in dividends in year t divided by last year’s dividends. Net trade credit is measured as 
accounts receivable less accounts payable, divided by total assets.   
 
3.3    Data and Sample 
 
The study sample initially contained all UK listed companies over the period 2004-2009, 
where all data was extracted from Datastream. However, due to various reasons we removed 
some firms from our final sample.  First, all those firms whose market value was not reported 
in UK Pound Sterling were excluded from the sample.  Second, financial firms were excluded 
from the sample for standard reasons. Third, following previous literature, utility companies, 
such as electricity, gas and telephone were excluded from the sample (Brav, 2009; Duchin, 
Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011;  Lin and Paravisini, 2012). Fourth, 
unquoted firms and firms missing data for the main variables of the study were excluded 
from the final sample. We also adjusted the data for outliers by winsorizing the top and 
bottom 1% of observations for all variables. The final sample thus includes 2039 listed UK 
companies. 
 
3.4 Model Specification and Econometric Issues 
 
We carried out the Hausman (1978) model specification test to compare the outcome of fixed 
and random effects models on the assumption that the outcome of both models will be 
similar.  The model specification test results confirmed that the outcome of the two sets of 
estimations as different.  We then compared the two sets of results and confirmed the use of 
fixed effects models as an appropriate method for this investigation over and above the 
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random effects models. We also considered other econometric issues such as; 
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity in the data.  First, for taking care of multicollinearity, 
simple correlations among variables were calculated. It has been argued in the existing 
literature that a high correlation value would indicate a sign of multicollinearity (Aivazian, 
Ge and Qiu, 2005). As a result, we carefully checked all the correlations among the variables 
and confirmed the presence of no high correlation among the variables.  We also take account 
of the issue of heteroscedasticity in the data by applying White (1980) consistent standard 
errors estimates.  The t-statistics reported in Tables 1-3 are based on robust standard errors 
estimates, based on White (1980). 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
 
4.1 Financial crisis and the debt structure of public firms 
 
While examining the effect of the credit crisis on the leverage ratios of public firms, we take 
two steps. In the first stage, we run the fixed effects regression model on total debt ratio and 
then in the second stage we run the regression models on short term debt, long term debt and 
trade credit separately. This analytical strategy permits us to identify the channel through 
which supply shocks travel and furthers our understanding of how firms switch across credit 
sources.  
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Table 1 
 
Effect of Financial Crisis on Leverage Ratio 
 
Variables Model c 
Total Debt 
Model d 
Long term 
debt 
Model e 
Short term 
debt 
Model f 
Trade credit 
ROA -0.126*** -0.002 -0.038*** ------ 
 (-3.99) (-0.26) (-3.58)  
GT 0.0002 -0.002** 0.002 0.001 
 (0.14) (-2.01) (1.04) (0.84) 
CF    -0.023*** 
    (-2.41) 
CR*ROA -0.002 -0.024*** -0.001 ------ 
 (-0.05) (-2.63) (-0.05)  
GT*CR 0.009*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.002 
 (2.77) (2.63) (-0.20) (1.21) 
CF*CR    -0.027*** 
    (-2.84) 
CR -0.013** -0.001 0.004 -0.007*** 
 (-2.32) (-0.31) (0.958) (-3.17) 
C 0.288*** 0.111*** 0.055*** 0.114*** 
 (80.72) (75.93) (21.61) (87.83) 
R-squared 0.731 0.820 0.594 0.815 
F-statistics 9.014 11.59 4.85 14.61 
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No of Obs 7546 5602 7492 7441 
 
Notes: Where CR represents the crisis dummy, CF represents cash flows from operations, GT stands for sales growth, and 
ROA specify return on assets. During the crisis period the effect on dependent variable is calculated by adding the 
coefficients of the given variable and variable interacted with the crisis dummy. Furthermore, in order to calculate the 
change in response relative to the pre-crisis and crisis period and the net-response during the crisis period the crisis dummy 
is interacted with control variables we have added the coefficients. In addition, the pre-crisis period is represented by the 
non-interacted variable coefficients. Also, ***, **, * specify 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
 
Table 1 presents results from the estimation of model (c-f).  The results show that the 
signs of all the independent variables are according to expectations.  Return on assets (ROA) 
has a significant, negative association with capital structure in the pre-crisis period.  We may 
assume that a higher ROA would mean a higher cash flow in the sample firms and the 
outcome is thus consistent with the pecking order theory which suggests that the availability 
of internal funds reduces firm’s reliance on external finance.  The coefficient on ROA 
interacted with the crisis dummy variable is negative but statistically insignificant. It is 
interesting to note that ROA is not significant in the crisis period. The insignificance may 
suggest that public firms are making financing decisions irrespective of their financial 
performance during the crisis period.  These results are in line with Deesomsak, Paudyal and 
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Pescetto (2004) who find that the sign and significance of profitability vary in leverage 
regressions between the post and pre-crisis period. However, other studies are inconclusive 
on the effect of profitability on firms’ financing decisions (see for example, Franks, Nyborg 
and Torous, 1996; Krishnan and Moyer, 1997; Fattouh, Scaramozzino and Harris, 2005; 
Garlappi and Yan, 2011).  
The results further show that the coefficient on the growth variable is positive in both the 
pre- and post-crisis periods. It is however, significant only in the crisis period.  This suggests 
that during the period of economic diversity firms in need of external finance are those which 
have insufficient internal funds for financing their growth. This finding is consistent with 
findings of some of the previous literature (see for example, Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Krishnan and Moyer, 1997;  Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris, 1999).  However, the 
finding is in contrast to some of the earlier studies (see for example, Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ozkan, 2001; Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal, 2008; Leary, 
2009) . The lack of significance of the growth variable in the pre-crisis period supports the 
argument that growth does not play a significant role in the financing decisions of firms 
during a normal time period. 
The results also show that the coefficient on the crisis dummy is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. The negative effect on total debt ratio is evidenced to the effect that the credit 
crisis has squeezed the flow of credit to these firms. Since total debt encompasses all forms of 
debt, including short term debt, long term debt and trade credit, we can plausibly argue that 
aggregate external financing activities of public firms reduced in response to the exogenous 
credit crisis.  In this regard, Lemmon and Roberts (2010) find a consistent result for firms 
with below investment grades.  By contrast, our results disagree with  the findings of Lin and 
Paravisini (2012) which suggest that  credit contractions have no effects on total debt ratio. 
Similarly, Campello et al. (2012) find that the average line of credit did not change during the 
crisis period. 
The results of model (c) do not reveal which component of total debt ratio is affected by 
the credit supply shock. To gain understanding of how individual components of debt 
structure respond to the credit supply shocks, we  ran separate regressions on long term debt, 
short term debt and trade credit as in equations (d)-(f).  In so doing, we are able to quantify 
the effect of substitution across the different credit sources. We also focused on the effect of 
the financial crisis with a view to identify which channels are affected the most by the recent 
panic in the financial markets. 
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The fixed effects regression for model (d) is run on long term debt. The results in column 
2 of Table 1, show that coefficient on the crisis dummy variable is negative, but statistically 
insignificant.  As a result, robust conclusion cannot be drawn from these findings.  The lack 
of significance may imply that the crisis has not affected the long term financing channel of 
public firms. This result seems to be inconsistent with the findings reported in Lemmon and 
Roberts (2010). They find that supply contractions have negatively affected the long term net 
debt issuance of the below-investment-grade firms. 
Next, we focus on the short term financing channel. The panel fixed effects regression for 
model (e) is run on short term debt. Results from the estimation of model (e) are presented in 
column 3 of Table 1, which suggest that the coefficient on the crisis dummy variable is 
positive, but statistically insignificant at the conventional level.  The results also suggest that 
the crisis has no significant impact on the short term financing channel. In other words, the 
flow of short term credit to large firms is not significantly affected by the recent credit 
retrenchments. 
Finally, the fixed effects regression is run on trade credit as in model (f). The results in 
column 4 of Table 1, show that majority of the control variables are significant with a high R-
square value.   Most notably, the coefficient of the crisis dummy is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. This suggests that the flow of trade credit to public firms is reduced during the 
crisis period.  These results are thus parallel to the findings of Kohler, Britton and Yates 
(2000).  They examined the trade credit behaviour of the UK quoted firms in a monetary 
tightening conditions, and find that quoted firms received less trade credit during the 
recession period.  However, our results are in contrast to Petersen and Rajan (1997), Biais and 
Gollier (1997), Nilsen (2002), and  Ge and Qiu (2007)  who report that firms increase the use 
of trade credit when the supply of  credit squeeze.  Overall, we argue that that the flow of 
trade credit is sensitive to the credit supply shocks in times of financial crisis. 
The results also suggest that the coefficient of cash flow interacted with the crisis dummy 
is negative (-0.02) and significant at the 1% level.  This finding indicates that internally 
generated funds negatively affect the firm’s demand for external credit (trade credit) during 
the crisis period.  This is consistent with the pecking order theory, i.e., the more internally 
generated fund is available, the less a firm needs external finance (trade credit).  This finding 
implies that internal fund is an important alternative to trade credit.  This finding is consistent 
with previous literature (see for example, Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; Franks and Goyal, 
2003; Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende, 2007). 
In addition, our results suggest the lack of substitution towards the source of short term 
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finance. The reduction in short term finance implies that public firms do not hedge 
themselves from the effect of credit supply contractions by resorting to trade credit. This may 
be because of the availability of other creditable channels available to these firms for raising 
funds such as, issuing equity, public debt and commercial papers in open markets (Gertler 
and Gilchrist, 1994). Overall, our results suggest that during the crisis period the flow of trade 
credit was negatively affected due to which public firms reduce the use of short term debt 
during the financial crisis. 
To sum up all the above discussions, we argue that the financial crisis has adversely 
affected the total debt ratio of public firms. Our investigation of the individual components of 
debt structure reveals that the adverse impact of the financial crisis works through the trade 
credit channel instead of the short term and long term financing channels.  Our study 
contributes to the existing literature by first demonstrating that both the demand and supply 
factors are integral parts of the firm’s financing decisions. Second, trade credit in the case of 
listed firms is sensitive to credit contractions. Third, trade credit does not compensate for a 
reduction in the supply of credit from financial institutions.  In the next section, we focus on 
the effect of credit supply shocks on firms’ behaviour about the use of alternative sources of 
finance. 
 
4.2 The Use of Alternative Sources of Finance 
 
We first examine firms’ behaviour of substituting to alternative sources of finance for 
offsetting the reduction in the level of debt in their capital structure.  The alternative sources 
of finance in this study refer to net debt issued, net equity issued, internal finance and 
dividends. The fixed effects panel regression is run separately on each of these variables as 
defined by Equations (g)-(j), for which the results are presented in Table 2. Model (g) 
presents the regression results on net debt issued.  The coefficient of the crisis dummy is -
0.50 and is weakly significant, suggesting that net debt issue of public firms was reduced 
during the crisis period.  This result is consistent with our earlier findings that contractions in 
credit supply have negatively affected the total leverage ratio of public firms.  
Model (h) presents the regression results on net equity issued.  It appears that the crisis 
exerts a significant negative impact on net equity issued by public firms. This is a clear 
indication that public firms issue less equity during the crisis period.  This result suggests that 
during the crisis period when the market underperforms, management of firms hold back by 
not issuing new equity. We can plausibly argue that equity finance is not a substitute to other 
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sources of finance in the market downturn.  These results are in line with some of the existing 
studies, for instance, Lemmon and Roberts (2010) which find limited evidence of substitution 
towards equity finance in addition to short term debt and trade credit. Our result, however, 
appears in contrast with that of Leary (2009) and Lin and Paravisini (2013)  which suggest 
that firms substitute to equity finance when credit becomes difficult to obtain from the 
financial market. 
 
Table 2 
Financial Crisis and Firms’ Substitution to Alternative Sources of Finance 
 
Variables Model g 
Net Debt 
Issue 
Model h 
Net Equity 
Issue 
Model i 
Cash Reserve 
Model j 
Dividends 
ROA 0.019 -0.806 -------         1.382 
 (0.04) (-0.88)  (11.59) 
GT -0.012 -1.054** 0.168* 0.401 
 (-0.17) (-2.06) (1.81) (5.65)*** 
CF   1.911***  
       (2.34)  
ROA*CR -0.076 1.783*** ------ 0.589*** 
 (-0.10) (2.90)  (4.029) 
GT*CR 0.500** 0.886*** -0.166 0.036 
 (1.99) (2.37) (-1.22) (0.35) 
CF*CR   2.323**  
   (2.28)  
CR -0.505* -2.154*** -0.902*** -0.252** 
 (-1.67) (-3.50)   (-3.98) (-2.305) 
C -0.026 2.544*** 1.796** -3.999*** 
 (-0.61) (3.01) (13.35) (-5.328) 
R-squared 0.274 0.357 0.318 0.529 
F-statistics 1.085 1.326 1.452 2.503 
Prob(F-statistics) 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No of Obs 5953 5156 7113 2271 
 
Notes: Where CR represents the crisis dummy, CF represents cash flows from operations, GT stands for sales growth, and 
ROA specify return on assets. During the crisis period the effect on dependent variable is calculated by adding the 
coefficients of the given variable and variable interacted with the crisis dummy. Furthermore, in order to calculate the 
change in response relative to the pre-crisis and crisis period and the net-response during the crisis period the crisis dummy 
is interacted with control variables we have added the coefficients. In addition, the pre-crisis period is represented by the 
non-interacted variable coefficients. Also, ***, **, * specify 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
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We next examine the change in cash and cash equivalent and consider whether firms 
increase the use of internal finance or hold cash during the crisis period.  The results from the 
estimation of model (i) are reported in column 3 of Table 2. We find a highly significant and 
negative impact of the crisis dummy on cash and cash equivalent. This is consistent with the 
expectations that firms reduce cash reserve during the crisis period. The reduction of cash 
reserve suggests the possibility that public listed firms increase the use of internal funds to 
finance the existing or essential operational and investment activities to counter the adverse 
effect of credit supply contractions.  
In addition, the coefficient of cash flow interacted with crisis dummy is positive and 
significant at the level of 5%.  This suggests that in order to cope with adverse credit 
conditions during the crisis period, firms that generate positive internal cash flows kept 
higher cash reserves. In addition, our results show that the interaction term of growth with the 
crisis dummy is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. This result confirms our 
earlier finding that firms with growth prospects need more external finance during the crisis 
period when credit supply squeezes. This finding is also consistent with previous findings in 
this area of research (see for example, Chen, 2004; Colombo, 2001). 
Our results are, in part, consistent with previously published studies in this area. For 
example, Leary (2009) argues that firms uses all forms of alternative financing including 
internal finance when they face restricted access to credit. Similarly, Campello et al. (2010) 
conduct a survey of chief financial officials and conclude that firms burn more cash during 
the crisis period. However, our results are in contrast with Lemmon and Roberts (2010) who 
finds limited evidence on substitution among alternative sources of finance including the use 
of internal finance. Overall our findings suggest that the pecking order hypothesis is also 
applicable to the corporate financing behaviour of public firms during the financial crisis 
period. 
This study further examines whether listed firms adjust their dividends pay-out policy 
during the crisis period. It is generally agreed that when obtaining external credit becomes 
difficult, firms scale back shareholder distributions to maintain their cash positions and 
spending on other essential operational and investment activities. The fixed effects regression 
model (j) is thus run on change in dividends.  The crisis dummy appears to be significant and 
negatively associated with the change in dividends.  This is consistent with the expectation 
that public firms adjust their dividends policies by means of reducing dividends pay-out to 
retain their financial slack in the economic downturn.  This finding also is consistent with 
those of Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) who argue that firms have deeper cut on 
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dividends distributions during the recent crisis period.  By contrast, Lemmon and Roberts 
(2010) find that firms with below investment-grade rating do not dip into cash reserve nor 
reduce dividends pay-out to counter the possible adverse effects of the crisis.  Our result 
provides evidence complementing the above studies by suggesting that dividends pay-out of 
public firms is sensitive to the credit market conditions. 
In addition, we have also classified the sample firms into liquidity-constraint group and 
liquidity-unconstraint groups on the basis of their average pre-crisis liquidity position. In line 
with previous literature in this area, we used cash and cash equivalent as a measure of 
liquidity (see for example, Duchin et al. 2010; Love et al. 2007). First, we identified all those 
firms in the sample whose cash and cash equivalent as a fraction of total assets was less than 
or equal to the sample mean and classified it as the liquidity-constraint group.  Second, we 
formed another group of firms whose average cash and cash equivalent figure as a fraction of 
total assets was greater than the sample mean and classified it as liquidity unconstraint firms.  
In this regard, earlier studies suggest that firms, which have greater ex ante liquidity, are 
less exposed to the financial shocks (see for example, Love et al. 2007; Campello et al. 
2009a; Duchin et al. 2010; Denis, 2011). Similarly, Gao and Yun (2009) find supportive 
evidence to the effect that the financial crisis of 2008 has a more pronounced impact on the 
performance of firms with low liquidity compared to those with high liquidity prior to the 
crisis. We hypothesize that firms with high cash reserve prior to the crisis are in a better 
position to cushion themselves from the negative credit supply shocks.  To test this 
prediction, we run separate regressions on the two groups using the fixed effects regression.  
The results reported in Table 3, highlight that financial crisis has adversely affected the total 
debt ratio of liquidity-constraint firms; however, its effect on the unconstraint firms is 
statistically insignificant which reveal that liquidity-constraint firms are hit harder by the 
financial crisis in comparison to unconstraint firms.  These findings are consistent with the 
existing literature concerning the credit supply effect. 
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Table 3 
The Effect of Financial Crisis on Liquidity Constraint and Unconstraint Firms 
Variables Constraint Firms  
Total debt 
Unconstraint Firms  
Total debt 
ROA -0.109*** -0.088*** 
 (-2.407) (-2.55) 
GT 0.002 0.003 
 (1.428) (1.10) 
ROA*CR 0.003 0.010 
 (0.087) (0.32) 
GT*CR 0.012 0.004 
 (1.344) (0.93) 
CR -0.019* 0.003 
 (-1.650) (0.38) 
C 0.340*** 0.162*** 
      (92.072) (20.67) 
R-squared 0.648 0.565 
F-statistics 6.644 4.649 
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 
No of  Obs 1116 2808 
Notes: Where CR represents the crisis dummy, GT stands for sales growth, and ROA specify return on assets. During the 
crisis period the effect on dependent variable is calculated by adding the coefficients of the given variable and variable 
interacted with the crisis dummy. Furthermore, in order to calculate the change in response relative to the pre-crisis and 
crisis period and the net-response during the crisis period the crisis dummy is interacted with control variables we have 
added the coefficients. In addition, the pre-crisis period is represented by the non-interacted variable coefficients. Also, ***, 
**, * specify 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
 
In addition, as a robustness check we removed all those firms from the sample which have 
a direct exposure to the subprime crisis, such as real estate firms, and re-run all the 
regressions. This enabled us to minimize any demand side factors which would otherwise 
affect our results (Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Lin and Paravisini, 2012). The revised 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the above tables.  We therefore argue that 
the results of this study which are drawn from the estimation of our models are not driven by 
the demand side factors2. The robustness check also strengthens the claims that we put 
forward in relation to the findings and implications of this research.  
In summary, our results appear to have identified that the financial crisis has adversely 
affected the total debt ratio of publicly listed firms.  The results further reveal that financial 
crisis works through the trade credit channel instead of the short term and long term debt 
channels.  In order to counter the adverse effect of the financial crisis, public firms increase 
the use of internal finance and scale back dividends payments which is consistent with it 
being part of the initiative for preserving their financial slack. The sample firms, however, do 
not substitute to the external sources of finance including net debt issue, equity finance and 
                                                 
2 In order to preserve space we do not report results of the robustness check analysis in the paper. 
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trade credit in the market downturn. In addition, the crisis has hit liquidity constraint firms 
much harder than the liquidity unconstraint firms. We therefore stress on the need for using 
effective financial management techniques by all firms in stable as well as adverse credit 
conditions. This is in line with Mac an Bhaird (2013) who argues that during the crisis period 
effective financial management techniques are specifically beneficial for those firms which 
heavily rely on external financing in their operations because these firms are fully exposed to 
the negative effects of the crisis.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the contemporary effect of the financial crisis on the financial policies of 
UK publicly listed firms and assesses its impacts on the individual components of the debt 
structure.  We adopt firm fixed effects model as our empirical strategy for this investigation.  
Using a sample of 2039 UK public firms over the period 2004-2009, we find that credit 
supply shocks have adversely affected the total debt ratio of publicly listed firms. In addition, 
our results also suggest that the credit supply contractions have impaired the trade credit 
channel of public firms.  In contrast, there is little evidence to suggest that the financial crisis 
had an impact on the short term and long term debt financing channels of public firms.   
The outcome of our findings thus suggests, that in order to counter the adverse effect of 
credit contractions, public firms increased the use of internal finance and adjusted their 
dividend policy by deferring the payment of dividends to shareholders.  We however, did not 
find any evidence in relation to public firms’ substitution to the use of net debt issue, net 
equity issue and/or trade credit during the financial crisis period. In addition, our results also 
reveal that liquidity-constraint firms with lower cash reserves prior to the crisis suffered more 
during tight lending conditions. As a robustness check all the regression models were re-
estimated without the inclusion of firms which has direct exposure to the credit crisis (such as 
real estate firms).  The results remained qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper 
suggesting that our results are not driven by the demand side factors.  Our overall findings 
thus appear to suggest that the financial policies of public firms are exposed to variations in 
the supply of credit in the course of the financial crisis, which, by implication, may pose a 
threat to their operations, sustainability and growth in the future.  
In light of the evidence presented in this study, we argue the findings of this study have 
several implications.  First, our evidence describes and explains the benefits of applying 
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effective financing policies by public firms, which helped them, manage their financing needs 
well during difficult times. This finding has implications for all publicly listed firms, 
suggesting that liquidity-constraint firms can use different financing channels for effectively 
managing the negative effects of financial crisis. Second, in terms of successfully managing 
the liquidity-constraint firms’ financial position we argue that management of these 
companies should apply effective financial management policies in stable business 
environments, which will be beneficial to them in preparing more effectively for managing 
their finances well during difficult economic conditions.  Third, our findings document the 
impact and implications of non-availability of external finance on the operations, 
sustainability and growth of public companies. As publicly listed companies play a 
significant role in the sustainability and growth of our economy and society, we argue that the 
findings of this research have implications for future financial regulation and policy making 
in the UK. 
This study explored the effects of the financial crisis on firms’ financial policies on the 
basis of annual panel data.  However, a number of studies have suggested that quarterly data 
can best capture subtle changes of the time series between the shorter periods (see for 
example, Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010; Chava and Purnandam, 2011; Murfin, 2012).  
However, due to the non-availability of quarterly data for the main variables of this study, we 
regard the use of quarterly data beyond the scope of this paper.  The application of quarterly 
data in relation to investigating the effects of financial crisis on the financial policies of UK 
public firms is therefore left to future research. Moreover, the influences which we analyse in 
this paper can be pursued into the role of relationship lending on the financing policies of 
firms during the crisis period. Evidence in the existing literature suggests that during the 
crisis period, maintaining a long term relationship with lenders would enable firms to pay 
lower interest rates and offer little or no collateral for receiving loans (Boot and Thakor, 
1994; Ioannidov and Ongena, 2010). An examination of the role of relationship lending 
during the financial crisis period would be worth investigating in future research.  
In addition, as highlighted by Lawson (2009) existing theoretical frameworks used by 
current research papers are insufficient for explaining the cases of the crisis. In line with this, 
as the research models of this paper are based on certain assumptions which may influence 
the results of the paper, concrete conclusions cannot be drawn from these results.  The use of 
alternative methodologies are therefore expected to produce new insights in this area.  As this 
research covers an important aspect of our society, the application of social theory that covers 
different key paradigms about the nature of social science and society as a whole will be 
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beneficial (Burrel and Morgan 1979). The use of triangulation method in future research is 
therefore expected to help in enhancing our understanding of the issues covered in this paper 
(see Downward, 2016). We therefore argue that for producing an in-depth understanding of 
the causes of the financial crisis a more sophisticated framework containing the application 
theoretical approaches from other disciplines will be beneficial. 
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